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1. Introduction
Gilbert (1997) has argued for an approach to argumentation theory in which the
argument itself, as an argument, is not considered the sole object of study, but
merely one piece of a larger context that includes much more than just what the
argument is superficially about. Argumentation theory, he argues, must
recognize the essentially goal-oriented nature of argument. In order to
understand the argument itself, we must bring into the picture the whole
background of beliefs and goals of the participants as crucial to what the
argument is. To understand the argument as an argument requires that more
than the argument be taken into consideration.
I will look at a simple (and purely hypothetical) example argument, in order to
see what deeper understanding we can arrive at through hierarchical goal
analysis. I will use Taylor’s theory of hierarchical goals in communication, which
he calls "layered protocols" (Taylor 1989; Farrell et al. 1999), as it is firmly
rooted in basic principles of biology, in this case perceptual control theory
(McFarland et al. 1957; Powers 1973; Taylor 1999; CSG). I will put forth some
preliminary ideas towards the development of practical argumentation therapy,
in which participants learn to argue better, based on Gilbert's notion of
coalescent argumentation (Gilbert 1997).
In sections 2-7, I will give a brief summary of perceptual control theory. In
sections 8-11, I will outline the theory of layered protocols (which is just
perceptual control theory applied to communication). In sections 12-14, I will
explain how layered protocols relate to argumentation in particular, and in
sections 15-23, I will explain how this theory might be used in coalescent
argumentation therapy. I will conclude with some general remarks and
discussion of future work.

2. Perceptual Control Theory: Behaviour is the Control of Perception
To understand argument, one must understand communication in general, and
to understand communication, one must view it as an activity of living
organisms. So any theory of argument must be built on a proper theory of what
a living organism is, and feedback control theory is the closest thing we
currently have to a generally accepted foundation for biology. Taylor builds his
theory of layered protocols (Taylor 1989; Farrell et al. 1999) on the control
theory of Powers, a variation on standard control theory called "perceptual

control theory", or just "PCT" (McFarland et al. 1957; Powers 1973).
PCT, unlike standard control theory, does not presume that an organism is
controlling something "out there" in the external world—instead, the organism
controls only internal perceptions. The standard notion of feedback control,
arising out of the work of Wiener (1948), views a living organism as a system
that controls certain variables in its environment, so that when a cat catches a
mouse, it is controlling the variable "mouse position", among others. Likewise,
when a human drives a car down a road, they are controlling the position of the
car relative to the centre of the road. Feedback control theory sees most of the
complex behaviours of living organisms as arising out of complex
organisations of control systems controlling various "environmental variables"
that are important for the organism’s survival.
These ideas have been enormously useful, but Powers, working on the ideas
of Ashby (1956), saw that the standard formulation had seriously misplaced the
role of perception. The basic idea of perceptual control dates all the way back
to Aristotle (c. 335-322 BC), who broadly speaking could be called the father
of PCT. Powers, who is generally considered the father of the modern, more
technical version of the theory, follows a similar line of reasoning to that of his
ancient Greek forefather, recognizing that the variable under control cannot be
an external variable "out there" in the world, but must be an internal variable,
namely a perception. (Some psychologists restrict the word "perception" to
mental states that correspond in a straightforward and obvious way to direct,
conscious sensory input, but the PCT community uses the word in a very
general sense that covers just about any, if not all, mental states, whether
conscious or not.)
Powers' system, like Aristotle's, is hierarchical. Perceptions are built up in a
layered fashion, on top of other perceptions, which are built on top of other
perceptions, etc., so we each perceive the world through a very different,
complex system of input filters that produce in each of us entirely different
perceptual variables. We cannot necessarily even perceive the variables that
another person perceives and controls (even when that person perceives them
perhaps quite effortlessly). We each divide the world up in our own way,
filtering it and analyzing it in ways that can potentially seem well nigh
unintelligible to another. Thus, another person’s behaviour sometimes makes
no sense at all to us when we try to find the external object out there in the world
that they are controlling, that towards which their thought is directed. This is
because each of us has analyzed the world into different world objects, or
"percepts" or "complex environmental variables", as they are called in the PCT
community.
Lower level motor control seems to work pretty much the same in all of us; it is
the higher level functions—such as choosing a job, a mate or a world-view, for
example—that can sometimes involve the control of perceptions that seem
almost impossible to fully grasp without actually being the person in question. It
can even be very difficult for the person to articulate to others what they are

controlling for. Scientifically, we must view such a person not as controlling
some external variable, but rather as controlling for having certain kinds of
perceptions, feelings, etc. Behaviour is the control of perception, not of the
external world (although the external world, as part of the feedback loop, will
normally end up being altered in the process).

3. The Basic Controller
The basic notion of perceptual control is simple. Every perceptual variable that
is controlled in the brain has a "comparator function", which takes some
perceptual input (perhaps already highly processed) and compares it to a
"reference" (what the system would like this variable to be). This produces an
"error" signal (the amount by which the input falls short of the reference), which
is then fed to an "output function", which decides how to act on the lower levels
(or the world) in order to minimize error. In this manner, the system gets
continual feedback on the result of what it is doing, forming a tight "closed
loop" with its environment.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the simplest type of control system. If we take
the perceptual and output functions to be simple sums, and the comparator to
be a subtraction, we get the simplest possible feedback control system. For
various technical reasons, the actual functions are likely to be at least
somewhat more complicated than this, but can still be quite simple (although
they can theoretically also be quite complex). In many models, the output
function is an integrator (i.e., an accumulator) with a decay rate, so that the
value changes relatively smoothly, instead of in fits and starts. There is also
usually a "gain" associated with the output function, which is simply a
multiplicative constant that determines how hard the controller pushes on the
environment (the lower levels) to get what it wants.

The hope of PCT is that our brain can be understood as a vast hierarchy of
such basic controllers. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the motor outputs to
the world and the sensory inputs, while at the highest level are the reference
signals that represent the ultimate goals that the entire rest of the hierarchy is
subservient to.

4. The Control Hierarchy
Lower level goals can change over time, since ultimately they are simply
functioning in service of the higher level goals. But the highest level goals of all
are physiological and hard-wired into us by evolution; they can never be
changed. All behaviour is some kind of attempt by this vast hierarchy to correct
certain error signals to bring its perception in line with its goal or reference
(behaviour is the control of perception). Higher level controllers tell lower level
controllers how to behave in order to achieve the higher-level goals. These
lower level controllers are free to come up with their own subgoals in order to
achieve this. These subgoals, while they may be pursued vigorously by the
organism, are still subordinate to the higher goals they serve, and if the
organism perceives at any time a better way to achieve the higher goal, it will
readily abandon the current lower-level goal.

Imagine yourself driving your car to work. You are continually controlling for
perceiving yourself near the centre of the road by acting on your steering wheel
percept. But why are you doing that? You might not be consciously thinking of it
at the time, but examine yourself carefully, and you will discover that you are in
fact controlling for getting to work, only on a somewhat longer time scale. On an
even longer time scale, you are controlling for making money, and ultimately for
being happy. "Happiness" in fact is the usual translation of Aristotle’s word for
the highest level goal in the hierarchy. In the modern theory, the highest level
has a variety of different references, corresponding to physiological states,
such as the levels of certain chemicals in the bloodstream, hormones, certain
kinds of neural excitation, etc. In general, one can think of the highest-level
goals as the basic drives and needs predetermined genetically (or perhaps
environmentally if they are determined early enough in life, while the brain is still
in development, so as to become effectively hard-wired).

Figure 2 depicts part of a control hierarchy for driving to work. At the highest
level shown (which is still far from being the highest level of all), the system is
controlling for making money. This money-controller is telling lower-level
controllers to drive the car, which are telling lower-level controllers to keep the
center of the road in the center of the visual field, which are telling still lowerlevel controllers to move the steering wheel this way and that. The referent at
each lower level is supplied by the behaviour of the higher level. The referent
for the staying-on-the-road subsystem is supplied by the behaviour of the
getting-to-work subsystem, for instance. The perceptual input for each higher
level system is taken from the percepts of multiple lower level subsystems. Not
only do higher level goals get controlled for on a longer time scale, but as we
go up the hierarchy, there are increasingly long delays between acting and

getting feedback about the result. Similarly, there is less ability to process
great quantities of information. Communication theorists would say that the
higher level controllers are processing input at a lower "bandwidth", or
information throughput.
With all these different controllers acting on the shared pool of lower level
subsystems, there will naturally be conflicts between different controllers
attempting to set lower level goals differently—hence the feelings of tension
that we experience all the time, such as "I want to go to work, and make
money, but at the same time I want to stay in bed and sleep."

5. Learning and Reorganisation
Humans do not have a fixed, unchanging control network to tell them how to
behave (although some animals do have such a system). Humans can change
their system radically in light of experience. So an accurate model of human
cognition in terms of PCT must include some kind of learning algorithm,
although there is no particular set of such algorithms written in stone within the
PCT community.
Some neural network algorithms can allow for incremental changes to a control
system's functions, so that it gradually learns to control better and better.
However, when error in the system is high for an extended period of time,
something more dramatic than small incremental changes may be called for. In
such a situation, the system is signaled to reorganize, at which time radical,
possibly random, changes are made, as the system attempts to overhaul its
strategy in a major way.
Reorganization could occur on the local level of a single controller, if that
particular controller has been failing to control its percept properly. Or, if the
whole system has been stuck in a rut, and error throughout the control network
has been too high, global reorganisation could be triggered, and fundamental
changes will be made throughout the system in an attempt to hit upon a
superior strategy for meeting the highest-level goals.

6. Imagination
Crucial to Powers' system is the concept of imagination. Note that in figure 1
the lower levels are alternatively labelled "world" or "imagination". Instead of
outputting to lower level controllers that eventually output to the real world,
control can also taken place internally, in imagination. Here, the feedback loop
is short-circuited and never passes through the environment at all, but instead
works through an internal world model. The organism interacts not with the
world but with its own internal imaginary world.

Why should an organism be involved in such a delusional activity? Simply to
test out methods of control before trying them for real. Once a method of
control has been executed on the real world, it may be too late to change the
result. Imagination is crucial in any control system sophisticated enough to
learn from its experience. Many possible techniques can be tried in
imagination, and the results observed, all in much less time than it takes to try
just one technique out for real, and without any potentially negative
consequences. Techniques (i.e., combinations of percept and output functions)
that work well in imagination can then be fixed as the ones to use for real. This
enables the organism to use its model of the world to make more correct
decisions about the best course of action to take to meet its goal.

7. The Test for the Controlled Variable
One of the fundamental principles of perceptual control theory can be summed
up by the slogan: "You can’t tell what someone is doing by watching what they
are doing." Of course, at times you can, but in general you cannot. It is entirely
possible to have two organisms behaving identically, while in fact they are not
really controlling for the same perceptual variables at all (or even particularly
similar ones). This is as true for rats in a lab as it is for people. The way a
scientist tests a rat to see what is "really going on" when it runs a maze, eats
cheese and presses buttons, is not just to watch and record observations, but
to repeatedly, and in various ways, disturb the organism in its attempt to
control. This is called the "test for the controlled variable".
To test if an apparent control for variable X is actually subservient to some
other dominant variable Y, we must disturb the (hypothesized) control of Y so
that control of the lower-level X variable no longer aids the organism in
controlling for the higher-level Y variable. If the organism immediately and
dramatically stops controlling for X, then there is strong evidence that Y is a
dominant control variable. If my boss calls me up on my wireless phone and
fires me while I’m on my way to work, I may suddenly lose my motivation for
driving to work.
But what if my boss calls, not to fire me, but to say that my salary has been cut
dramatically. If my main goal in working at that particular job was to make lots
of money, I may immediately quit, and turn the car around. If, on the other hand,
the main goal I was satisfying by working there was personal fulfillment, and I
love my job, I may be relatively unaffected by the news. You cannot determine
which of these situations is the case by watching me drive to work. My
behaviour is identical in both cases, even though what I'm really doing, on the
longer time scale, is quite different.
8. Layered Protocols: Communication is the Control of Belief
Just as in general human behaviour is the control of perception,
communication in particular, according to Taylor, is the control of belief (Taylor

1989; Farrell et al. 1999), including the control of one's beliefs about the beliefs
of others. For Taylor, a "belief" is a kind of coherent system of perceptions
brought together in one’s internal model of the world, required to transform
error signals into the appropriate output to achieve control.
"Control of belief" may be a bit too general as a slogan for "communication",
as the word is generally understood, since it would cover some situations
where one is not really communicating in the traditional sense, such as sitting
in an armchair and ruminating about the world. Here, one is trying to control
certain aspects of one’s belief system, yet no communicating partner is
involved. One tries, within oneself, to bring one’s internal belief system into line
with some goal (logical consistency, for instance, or perhaps the ability of the
belief system to make one feel good). This could, of course, still in a sense be
thought of as communication, if we conceive it as a kind of "talking to oneself".
Unless specifically noted otherwise, I will use the word "communication" in the
more general and paradigmatic sense of information flowing between different
persons, rather than between internal components of a single person.
This is not to say that in communication, we are directly controlling another
person’s belief system. In PCT, the other person’s belief is never controlled
directly, but only indirectly through the control of one’s own beliefs about that
person’s beliefs. This process may or may not be that relevant to what the
other person's belief actually is, since our perception of their belief is filtered
through many layers of the control hierarchy.

9. Felicity Conditions for Communication
Taylor lists three fundamental propositions that can be used to express the
basic "felicity conditions" that determine in general whether a communication
will take place and when it will terminate (although any particular situation may
yield a larger number of felicity conditions specific to that particular
communication):
P1: the receiving partner has an understanding of the message.
P2: the receiving partner’s understanding of the message is adequate.
P3: it is no longer worth trying to achieve (P1 & P2).
A communication is terminated when both partners come to believe strongly in
P3. The goal of the communication, at least for either or both partners that are
cooperating in the attempted communication, is to come to believe (P1 & P2),
and to believe that the partner believes (P1 & P2) as well. From this, belief in
P3 normally follows (since if P1 and P2 are already achieved in both partners,
there is obviously no longer any point in trying to achieve them). If only P3 is
believed, however, the communication is also terminated, but with the goal of
the communication left unfulfilled.

If both partners believe all three propositions, then the communication has
ended successfully. If, for example, Bill was sending a message of some kind
to Susan, then Bill now believes that Susan has some belief/perception in her
mind that she believes corresponds to the belief/perception that Bill has in his
mind that he was trying to communicate (i.e. he believes P1). Susan believes
she has a perception/belief in her mind that corresponds to the one Bill has in
his mind, so she also believes P1. Bill also believes that Susan believes P1—
he believes that Susan believes that he believes she has received the
message. And Susan believes that Bill believes P1—she believes that he
believes that she believes she has received the message. If a similar situation
of reciprocal belief exists for the adequacy of the message, then both partners
also believe P2, and hence P3, and the communication terminates.
So by satisfying the conditions for successful communication, Bill must do
more than just believe that Susan perceives his perception/belief accurately.
He must do more than believe that she believes that she perceives it
accurately. He must also believe that she believes that he believes that she
perceives it accurately.
An infinite regress suggests itself here. Why not demand that Bill also believe
that Susan believe that he believes that she believes that she perceives the
message correctly, and so on to as many levels as desired? Taylor’s answer is
simply that further levels provide no further useful information that allows either
partner to meet their goals, and thus has no effect on actual behaviour. In actual
dialogue, it is enough for each partner to not only believe the communication
was successful, but to believe that their partner is likewise satisfied. This
general requirement yields the number of reciprocal belief levels described
above, no more and no less.

10. Belief
I have been calling Bill’s message a "belief/perception" to avoid committing to
whether Bill is communicating a belief-perception or a non-belief-perception.
Although the boundary line between the two is fuzzy, I will define a belief as a
perception or complex of perceptions that has become so embedded in a
person’s internal world model that it exerts a persistent influence over time on
how their control system transforms its goal and current perception into action
(behaviour). This means that a belief need not be at all propositional. It simply
needs to be a perceptual pattern that one persistently uses in understanding
the world.

11. Layered Messages and Protocols
Just as a regular perceptual control network is layered, with long-time-frame
higher levels telling short-time-frame lower levels what to do, a higher level

controller that is attempting to send a message to a recipient may need to
initiate the sending of many lower-level submessages in order to communicate
the main message (what Taylor calls the "prime message").
Sending a message is not just a matter of a stream of letters or sounds leaving
the sender and arriving at the recipient. As the message is being sent, the
sender receives constant feedback from the other person as to how they are
doing, how close they are getting to producing in the other person the
perception they want. This requires that many "protocol" submessages be
sent, such as "I'm ready to receive", "yes, I got that" or "huh, say again?" The
standard protocols we tend to use most often in human communication have
been formalized by Taylor in his General Protocol Grammar (GPG), although
the full technical details will not concern us here.

12. Argumentation and Layered Protocols
In order to apply layered protocols to argumentation, we must first determine
what makes argument different from regular discourse. I will characterise
argumentative discourse as follows:
(1) The communication is two-way, each partner acting as both a sender and a
receiver.
(2) The messages being sent are not merely perceptions, but beliefs.
(3) Each partner believes, at some level in their hierarchy, that they cannot
believe both their own message and their partner’s message, seeing the
incoming message as incompatible with their existing belief system.
If any of these conditions are absent, then we are not really dealing with an
argument, or at least not a mutual argument (although it is possible, for
instance, for one partner to see the communication as an argument, where the
other sees it as a nonargumentative discussion, and the dividing line between
the two will naturally be fuzzy). In argumentation, we are trying to convince the
other to not only perceive some idea or thought, but to believe it. That means
more than merely inducing in your partner some perception or other; your
partner must make this perception a reasonably permanent part of the internal
world model they use to control their perceptions in general. Furthermore, both
you and your partner must each believe, at some level of your control
hierarchies, that the other's message is incompatible with your own—that it is
not possible to believe both.
Note that I said "at some level of the hierarchy". This qualification is necessary,
since it is possible that, at a higher level of the hierarchy, one of the arguing
partners does not really believe in the truth of their message at all, nor even in
its incompatibility with the incoming message. In cases like this, such as
insincerity or devil’s advocate, the arguer is nonetheless undeniably taking on

the beliefs required in (3) above, even if at some subordinate level of control.
According to our technical definition, this still qualifies as belief, since it affects
control persistently over time. But it is belief that is induced by a higher,
dominant goal level where the belief is not actually held. The higher level is, in a
sense, simulating the belief at the lower level.
If one was to use the broader definition of communication mentioned earlier,
where we allow communication to be within an organism between its internal
components, we would say that the higher level has communicated a belief to
the lower level, one which it does not itself hold. This might even take the form
of an internal argument, if the lower level had to be "convinced". This does not
result in the same degree of internally felt tension, however, as conflicting goals
at the same level, since the "pretend" goal is clearly subordinate to the higher
level goal. If I am truly conflicted, really not able to decide whether it means
more to me to get out of bed and go to work or to stay in bed and sleep, then
my internal "argument" is most likely between goals at the same level of the
hierarchy.
We should avoid the temptation to say that the incompatible incoming and
outgoing messages are contradictory, or that the goal is to arrive at the truth.
What makes the discussion argumentative is the belief that the two messages
are incompatible in some way or another. This may or may not be an explicit
belief in their logical inconsistency. If Bill tells Susan, "I think your dress is too
flashy," and Susan responds, "Well, it’s what I’m in the mood for today", Susan
does not believe her desire to wear the dress is logically inconsistent with its
being too flashy. This simply is not solely a matter of inconsistency, nor is it
strictly a matter of propositions. Susan has a perception of the dress, at least
on this particular day given her mood, that has enough permanence and
influence on her behaviour that we call it a belief. But it is not properly
understood as a proposition. It is made up of, as least partially, her perception
of how the dress fits into what she feels satisfies her goals for this occasion,
whatever those may be. This "belief" may be completely prelinguistic, and
Susan may even be incapable at this point of fully expressing it in words.
Susan is not trying to convince Bill that her mood is inconsistent with the dress
being too flashy, she is simply trying to say that right now, her mood is what is
more important to her, and she just wants Bill to see that. She sees Bill’s
message as conflicting with her belief in the current wearability of the dress,
were she to adopt it on the same level as her belief in her mood. So she
cannot believe both on that level.
The reason Bill’s statement and Susan’s reply is an "argument", and not simply
a discussion, is that Bill is trying to get Susan to change her belief (or at least
he perceives that he is doing this—he may be mistaken about her beliefs). But
Susan does not believe it possible to hold her existing belief about her dress
and its role in her current control, and also to hold the one Bill is trying to induce
in her, at the same level in her hierarchy. So she argues back, trying to change
Bill’s belief in turn. In this case, she is being mostly defensive, and may only
want to get Bill to believe that there is no point in bugging her anymore, or

perhaps a bit more strongly she may want him to believe that it is a good and
reasonable thing for her to be positive about her dress. In any case, she wants
to change his belief in some way, or else there would only be a one-way
argument.

13. Argument Settlement and Resolution
It is possible for Bill and Susan to be at complete odds with respect to the
messages they think are being sent and received. Bill might think he is trying to
convince Susan that red is a tacky colour, while Susan believes that it is the
pattern that is perhaps a little flamboyant but perfect for this particular
occasion, and so this must be what Bill is talking about. The point is that they
mutually agree that there is an incompatibility in the reciprocal messages, not
that they need have any agreement as to what those messages are. Indeed,
misunderstandings as to what messages are being sent are quite normal,
since much of real argument consists in the participants struggling to belief (P1
& P2), and until they do they could be completely mistaken as to the nature of
the messages. If they both understood each other’s message perfectly, then
quite likely they would either come to an agreement or believe P3 without
believing (P1 & P2). If all three propositions are believed, then we will say that
the argument is "resolved". If only P3 is believed, then the argument is
"settled", but not resolved.
There are in general four beliefs to be concerned about in argumentation.
There is (1) the belief Bill is trying to transmit to Susan and (2) the belief Bill
believes Susan is trying to transmit to him. These may or may not be the same
as (3) the belief Susan believes Bill is trying to transmit to her and (4) the one
she is trying to transmit to him. Bill’s side of the communication qualifies as
argumentative if at some level affecting the discussion he believes that he
cannot believe both messages as he perceives them. Likewise for Susan, who
sees her discussion with Bill as argumentative because she does not believe
she can believe that the dress is too tacky and also believe in her desire to
wear the dress enough to actually put it on and go out. If she does find herself
believing both of these, at the same level of the hierarchy, while still seeing her
discussion with Bill as an argument, then she is in a classic case of conflict,
and will conduct an "internalized argument" of some kind to try and resolve the
issue.
Since the two partners start out believing that they cannot, at the same level of
control, believe both messages, a resolution (as opposed to a settlement)
necessarily implies that either one or both participants have:
(1) changed the message they were sending,
(2) changed the message they perceived the other person to be sending, or
(3) ceased believing they could not believe both messages.

In (1) the person has become convinced of the other’s position. In (2), the
person has changed their mind about what they thought the other person was
claiming, resulting in case (1). In (3), they have not changed their mind about
the nature of the messages at all, but have decided that both can be believed
simultaneously.
The attempt to achieve (P1 & P2), so crucial to any argument, is rarely the
result of a straightforward transmission of a message from A to B and then
another from B to A. Recall that we are starting out with neither partner
particularly understanding what beliefs are even at issue. Therefore, much time
is spent exchanging protocol messages, to indicate things like "yes I
understand", or "huh? what’s that?" (which tells the other person that you do not
understand and they must put off believing P2; it also gives them a clue as to
how to go about successfully transmitting the message).

14. An Argument is More Than Just an Argument
If an argument is to be properly analyzed, it is not enough to analyze the
hierarchical structure of the argument per se (as an argument). The reason is
that, just as a lower level subargument cannot be fully separated from the
dominant argument it serves without misunderstanding it, so the entire
argument as such cannot be separated from the rest of the control hierarchy
without misunderstanding it. What people do when they argue is to control, or
seek to control, their internal beliefs about what others believe. Beliefs are just
a kind of perception, so argumentation is simply one kind of general feedback
control, which uses the protocols of cultural communication for feedback.
This process is inevitably hierarchical. There are subgoals and subarguments
that are spawned in order to support the more general argument. This
corresponds in a precise manner to a control hierarchy (argument being just
one type of feedback control activity a living organism can engage in). The
transmission of a message is modified according to feedback from the
communicating partner (which is largely the "world" for the purposes of
analyzing the argument). In order to achieve this, a subargument may need to
be argued for and resolved first. This subargument, with its own possibly quite
different incoming and outgoing messages, is not the dominant argument,
however, as it merely serves the main argument. The main argument takes
place, as for any higher level control, on a longer time scale, with longer delays,
and less bandwidth.
In order to convince Susan that her dress is tacky, Bill may get sidetracked into
convincing her first that the social function they are attending is semi-formal,
which has nothing directly to do with her dress. This argument, as a
subargument, gets resolved or settled before the main argument. The main
argument has longer delays, because it must wait for the subargument to be
settled (which may take hours) before it can "resume". (Although it is of course
an abstraction to view the higher level as "suspended" at all, since the

discussion about the semi-formal issue is the conducting of the tacky-dress
argument, which in a way has not really been suspended at all.)
What may be surprising is that much (although not all) of what is left implicit and
unspoken in an argument is actually higher up in the hierarchy, and so
dominant over the more explicit and obvious aspects of the argument. The
explicit messages act in service to the implicit messages. Moreover, the entire
argument is itself a mere part of a larger control hierarchy, which is not in itself
argumentative at all.

15. Layered Goals and Beliefs In Coalescent Argumentation
Gilbert argues that, rather than focussing on an idealized, logic-based
formulation of an argument as a search for the truth, we should seek to analyze
the goal structure of the participants. More importantly, the participants
themselves can use this kind of analysis to improve their chances of reaching a
resolution. Instead of concentrating narrowly on the "issue at hand" (i.e., the
explicit lower subordinate levels), the arguers can work at constructing proper
models of each other’s goal hierarchies, attempting to uncover as much of the
hierarchy as possible. In particular they should be concerned with uncovering
goals that are relevant to the dynamics of the argument, but previously
unrecognized.
This approach will allow the participants to avoid just "going for the win". In
uncovering the dominant, upper layers of the goal hierarchy, as well as
unrecognized goals on the same level as the subordinate argument, the
participants can concentrate on achieving their goals in some other fashion
than that assumed in the subordinate argument. In this way, seemingly
intractable arguments can often be resolved into agreement.
I will begin with an overview of goals in argumentation as presented by Gilbert
(1997: 67-74), developed within the paradigm of layered protocols. Gilbert’s
view of a belief system is more of a "web" than a hierarchy, but the strict
hierarchical nature of PCT and layered protocols can easily be modified to
accommodate something like this (although by its very nature, layered
protocols is best suited to at least a loosely hierarchical structure).
According to the logic-based approach to argumentation theory, the goal of an
argument is to convince the opponent that one’s claim is true. According to
Gilbert, while this may be a goal of an argument, it is not necessarily the goal.
There may be many goals, acting on different levels (these different levels we
will take to be roughly equivalent to the layered protocol goal hierarchy).
Arguers must negotiate between many possibly conflicting goals, of three
basic types, which Gilbert organizes into the following ordered (i.e. prioritized)
sets:
Motives: M = {m1, m2, …}

These determine the other goals in a broad, general way. They are thus roughly
equivalent to the highest level goals in the PCT hierarchy (those that are above
the level of the argument per se).
Task goals: T = {t1, t2, …}
These goals are the obvious focus of the argument, and are thus roughly
equivalent to the lower level goals in the PCT hierarchy.
Face goals: F = {f1, f2, …}
These are goals having to do with the personal relationship between the
arguers. Thus, they can also be either task goals or motives. In the PCT
hierarchy, these might be found high up in the hierarchy, or lower down.
All these goals are delimited by a set of procedures, P = {p1, p2, …}. These
procedures are roughly equivalent to the protocols used in the PCT hierarchy
to exchange information, although we could interpret them more broadly to
include any rule of operation of the control hierarchy, whether directly related to
communication or not. For instance, the protocol of nodding one’s head every
once and a while when listening, indicating understanding, would be one such
procedure, and is also clearly a communication protocol. But we could also
include the general procedure used in all control systems of taking one’s goal
(or reference signal), comparing it to the perceptual input, and thereby
producing an error signal that is used to produce behaviour. This general
procedure is, of course, not special to communication or argumentation, but is
simply used in all behaviour for any living organism. Other less general
delimiting procedures would include any particular way of translating error
signals into behaviour that a particular individual has adopted from experience.
For instance, an individual might have a tendency (conscious or unconscious)
to always check out whether a person is fidgeting while they talk, as they tend
not to trust someone who fidgets. This is a procedure used to translate error
into behaviour, although not a universally adopted one. Another kind of
procedure that we will also include would be the way that a person builds their
perception up in the first place, before comparing it with their goal (as
mentioned earlier, we all do this differently).
Thus, we see that so far there are (at least) four different types of delimiting
procedures:
(1) general rules for the operation of control systems.
(2) specific rules for translating error into behaviour.
(3) specific rules for translating sensory data into perception.
(4) communication protocols (of type 2 and 3).
(5) argumentation protocols (of type 2 and 3).

"Goals alone," says Gilbert, "are insufficient to predict or delimit action." There
are multiple ways to achieve any given goal. What behaviour will be chosen
depends on many other variables, such as the procedures and protocols
adopted by the participants, and of course the actual physical situation in
which they find themselves.
Note that Gilbert’s goal sets are prioritized, meaning that some are more
important than others. When two goals conflict, the more important one will be
acted on, and the other neglected. For Gilbert, the goal of an argument is less
to persuade and more to maximize one’s "overall degree of [goal]
satisfaction". This is not a simple ratio of number of successes over failures,
since the more important goals will have more weight. In terms of PCT, since
we have a huge hierarchy of goals seeking fulfillment simultaneously, the
"overall satisfaction" is roughly the inverse of the total error at the top level we
are concerned with, weighted by the gain on each subsystem within that level
(recall that the gain on each individual controller is how hard that particular
subsystem is trying to achieve its goal).
Higher priority goals will thus have higher gains than less important goals. The
gain is usually multiplied by the error to produce the actual output of the
controller. So if we double the gain on a "get to work" controller that is telling a
lower level controller to "stay on the road", the system will be twice as likely to
act, or will act twice as forcefully (depending on the exact nature of the output
function).
A crucial aspect of coalescent argumentation, as compared to more logicbased approaches, is the increased role played by face goals and motives, as
opposed to the more obvious task goals (although the role of task goals is by
no means downplayed). In most real argumentation, task goals, while
important, are only a small piece of the picture. Face goals may be more
important, and the participants usually have broader motives not obvious from
the actual argumentation.

16. Constructing Goal Hierarchies: Test for Controlled Variables
Goal analysis (the actual construction of a PCT goal/belief hierarchy) concerns
us in two respects: (1) a third-party argument analysis will begin with an
analysis of the goal structures, or control hierarchies, of the participants, and
(2) the participants themselves will need to perform something like this
analysis, explicitly or implicitly, on both their opponent and themselves if they
are to effectively argue.
Constructing such an analysis will require using the test for the controlled
variable. While much of a person's hierarchy may be uncovered by passive
observation, without interacting with the person and disturbing their control,
much of the hierarchy will remain a mystery. Application of the test also
illustrates why goals that are above the level of the argument per se are so

important in an analysis of the argument, since they can have dramatic impact
on the way an argument will be affected by new and unexpected disturbances.
Arguing partners, of course, have only a limited ability to use the test for the
controlled variable, and only limited ability to model their own or their
opponent's hierarchies. We cannot, during a real argument, fire someone or
cut their salary just to see how they will react. However, we can simulate the
disturbance by suggesting it, getting the person to have one level of their
control hierarchy simulate the salary cut at a subordinate level, and then we can
observe the result of that.

17. An Example: Bill and Susan
Bill is arguing with Susan, who is a coworker. To a casual observer, it appears
that Bill and Susan are simply squabbling over whether company X is or is not
good at making widgets. A non-goal-oriented, logic-based approach might
analyze the validity of their arguments with respect to that issue, and ignore
their larger motives and face goals. This does not mean the logic-based
approach would necessarily restrict itself to formal, deductive methods, but it
would generally insist on looking only at the validity of the arguments put
forward concerning company X’s widget making ability. Other factors would be
allowed only if they were relevant to justifying these positions.
But Gilbert’s approach says no, while it may be important and significant to
look at the logical validity of Bill’s and Susan’s arguments, if we are to really
help Bill and Susan argue more effectively, we need to consider the broader
picture of what these two people are actually doing. In analyzing their goal
hierarchies, we do not wish to go looking so high in their hierarchies that we
just end up looking at the same physiological goals everybody shares. But
neither do we want to stay so close to the argument per se that we miss what is
really important.
It may turn out that Bill is really more concerned with getting a raise than
"finding out the truth" about company X’s widget expertise. To test for this, we
must do more than simply observe Bill in action and look at whether his
arguments are valid, we must actively interfere with the system, as with the rat
in the maze, poking and prodding Bill in various ways to see if he has
significant higher level goals and what effect (if any) they have on the current
argument. This is not only something we do as third-party observers attempting
to describe and explain the interaction, but it is something Susan will also try to
do, should she choose to argue with Bill's position (especially if she decides to
use our brand of coalescent argumentation therapy). It is also something Bill
himself ought to do (self-analysis), especially if he is not fully aware of his own
motivations for badgering Susan.
As it turns out (let us presume), Bill and Susan’s company, in Bill’s judgement,
would greatly benefit from a relationship with a company skilled in widget

making, and this would very likely result in raises for everyone in Bill's division.
As a result, he is trying very hard to get Susan, the resident widget-expert, to
forge new ties with company X. He tries to convince her that this will result in
good things for the company and a raise for her (although what he is really after
in all this is a raise for himself). But he finds her resistant. She perceives
company X through very different eyes than Bill, and cannot really see why he
thinks they are good at making widgets. To her, their widgets are obviously
totally lame. She is tempted to dismiss Bill’s arguments, but instead decides to
delve into the argument, since it is always possible Bill might have a point, and
since she would like a raise, it is worth pursuing up to a point.
Susan may not have a pre-existing model of Bill she is satisfied with, and so
will apply the test for the controlled variable, trying to figure out what makes Bill
tick. Ideally she should actually change the conditions for what she is
hypothesizing might be Bill's higher level goal, for instance by actually removing
the circumstances within the company that might potentially lead Bill to think
that ties with the other company would get him a raise. But, as is often the
case, this kind of radical disturbance is not practical, so Susan will be
somewhat subtle and simulate such disturbances, by suggestion. She will try to
induce in Bill a simulation of the desired belief at a lower level, under control of
a higher level that very well knows that such is not the case. In other words, she
gets Bill to imagine that their company would not respond with raises for
everyone in Bill's division. We do this sort of thing all the time in argumentation
and it is very important. To build a model of the opponent's hierarchical goal
structure, we suggest disturbances, and see if we get some indication of the
reaction that a real disturbance would have elicited.
Not only are higher level goals, or motives, important to argument analysis, but
face goals must also be included. A face goal is a goal that has to do with the
maintenance of the participants' personal relationship. Whenever people
communicate, they will (almost always) be highly constrained by their desire to
maintain or establish certain kinds of relationships with others. Perhaps Susan
really would have just dismissed Bill’s argument, uninterested in continuing,
were it not for the fact that she has a crush on him, and is interested in him
sexually. Sex is a powerful motivator, even when we try so hard to pretend it is
irrelevant. Were we to apply the test for the controlled variable to Susan, by
informing her that Bill is gay for instance, she might realize she has no chance,
and lose interest in the argument, as the only thing now contributing to her goal
of understanding Bill is her desire for a raise, and she really does not take his
argument seriously enough to pursue the discussion on that basis alone.
Bill, of course, no doubt has face goals as well. He may also be controlling for
spending more time with Susan. But perhaps Bill is doing it with a different
motive. Whereas Susan has a romantic crush on Bill, Bill simply has a general,
overarching principle of wanting to work with any colleagues he has not yet
spent much time with. As a result, he also has a face goal to spend more time
with Carol down the hall. We could, again, test for this (at least in theory) using
the test for the controlled variable.

Note that while task goals are generally lower-level and higher-bandwidth, they
are not necessarily at the bottom of the hierarchy. They may themselves need
to further invoke lower level controllers (for hand-eye coordination, perhaps)
that are needed to carry out the communication, but are not themselves the
obvious focus of the argument.
While the main task goal is the most apparent goal to an observer of the
argument, the actual arguer might see a higher-level goal as more the focus of
what s/he is doing. Bill, for instance, is to a casual observer arguing with Susan
about company X’s widget expertise. But he himself may be very aware
throughout the argument of his more crucial goal of getting Susan to forge ties
with company X. Thus, it is this goal that Gilbert calls the "apparent strategic
goal", which may or may not be the main task goal, depending on the
circumstances.

Figure 3 shows a simplified analysis of Bill’s and Susan’s control hierarchies
(some parts of the diagram have yet to be explained). This is a greatly
simplified diagram, of course, showing only some of the major connections
between Bill and Susan. Each box is a subcontroller, controlled by one or more
higher-level controllers. The arrows between the boxes, whether providing
perceptual input or behavioural output, are labelled with beliefs (although the
reader should keep in mind that we are using the word "belief" in the broad
sense of any procedure for converting signals into behaviour or perception that
persists in an individual over time).
There is a line in the diagram that separates the "claims" from the "positions".
A claim is the outwardly apparent assertion made by one of the partners in the
argument. Gilbert takes the term "position", however, as a deeper term

referring to the whole complex of beliefs and goals behind the claim. A claim is
just an outward label for the much richer and more complex position. Thus, the
claim side of the line in figure 3 is in the external world, while the position side
is in the brain. Although I have shown the external world in figure 3 as only
containing the claims, there is much more going on than that, of course. The
world is the environment that links the two partners, and information can be
transformed and constrained in all kinds of ways by it.
Indeed, only a small part of the actual control hierarchy is shown here, and
many links that no doubt exist between the boxes are not drawn in. This is just
to keep things simple. In reality, for example, the outputs that Bill and Susan
trade back and forth are immensely more complicated than the simple claims
in the diagram, and they input into many more of the other partner’s
subcontrollers than what is shown. I have simply depicted a few key points
where the perceptual inputs particularly matter. Note, too, that exactly how this
perceptual input gets processed is up to the organization of the perceiver’s
network. Susan cannot attach to her speech acts markers that tell Bill’s brain
how to perceive what she is saying. Each of us builds the world in our heads
afresh and in our own unique way, so there is no guarantee as to how others
will reconstruct what we have tried to communicate.

18. Loosening the Hierarchy
While PCT networks are generally perceived as hierarchical in nature, and
W.T. Powers (who is arguably the father of the field) views them as strictly
hierarchical, it is not necessary that this be so. Beliefs may be interconnected
in something more like a web than a hierarchy. A web structure would make
the system less predictable, since the effects of a radical change in one belief
could not be traced so easily through the system if "lower-level" goals that are
supposedly subordinate end up looping back up and changing the higher level
goals that helped determine them in the first place! This could make analysis
much more difficult, but it is perhaps more in keeping with the way human
beings work.
Take, as an example, Bill’s face goals. So far, we have seen that he has a face
goal to spend more time with both Susan and Carol. Now there is obviously at
least some conflict involved here, in the sense that he (probably) cannot easily
spend more time with both of them. He must spend less time with each, or
decide which one he wants to concentrate on getting to know better. This is not
a serious conflict within his own web/hierarchy, since the source of the conflict
is simply the constraints imposed on his control by the outside world.
However, let us consider a more serious internal conflict for Bill. Let us
presume that Carol and Susan despise each other, so much so that they both
tend to avoid anyone who chums around with the other. Now Bill knows this (or
more accurately, he believes it, so it is a constraint on his action, whether it is
really true or not), so he realizes that if he tries too hard to convince Susan to

forge ties with company X, he may lose any chance of trying the same with
Carol, and vice-versa.
In terms of his face goals, Bill has been torn for some time between Susan and
Carol. Perhaps in his set of delimiting procedures, he has an overarching
principle of leaving things alone in such cases, and he has been avoiding both
Carol and Susan for quite a while. Perhaps someone else would have just
flipped a coin. In figure 3, however, we see that Bill’s task goal has caused him
to go with Susan, because she is the widget expert. On the other hand, Bill
could just as easily become conflicted again. For instance, he could be pushed
back to Carol when he realizes that Susan is really very resistant, or perhaps
when he realizes she is interested in him romantically.
Bill’s goal/belief hierarchy is not a strict hierarchy at all in this case. The two
subordinate subsystems looping back and mutually attempting to negate each
other’s parent control systems cannot be redrawn as a true hierarchy (the fact
that they are attempting to negate a goal is indicated by a minus sign in the
diagram). The more ubiquitous are these tangled loop-backs, the less sensible
is it to speak of a strict hierarchy. However, I think it still makes sense to talk of
the overall system as a hierarchy of sorts, as there will still be a general
tendency for goals to be layered, with long time delays and low bandwidth for
the more crucial goals, and high bandwidth, short time delays for the
subordinate goals. However, I will refer to such a system as a "loose
hierarchy", since the principle of hierarchical organization will be everywhere
violated, with only a loose tendency for an overall layering into motives and task
goals. Obviously, in such a complex system, the distinction between a motive,
a task goal and a face goal can become very slippery indeed.

19. Thrashing
A common problem in control systems is the phenomenon of "thrashing". This
occurs when the output gain on a controller is too high. Feedback control
requires that the actions we output to our environment (such as speech acts)
be slow enough for change to occur gradually and smoothly, and for our
reactions to likewise be gradual and smooth. Radical action in a short time can
completely swamp our ability to deal with the results. The output gain is the
degree to which we are "pushing" out on the environment (and hence, in
argument, on our communicative partner). If this gain is large, we are trying
very hard to get what we want, to meet our goals. One of the most important
lessons from control theory, whether applied to an individual organism or to
society as a whole, is that if one tries too hard, everything falls apart.

The graphs in figure 4 are adapted from computer simulations (Randall 1994,
1995) of control systems meant to mimic living organisms (although such
simulations are, of course, only crude imitations of the real thing). The point of
showing them here is not to make a rigorous technical point (I have not
presented the technical details of control simulations enough in this paper to
warrant such discussion), but rather just to suggest some general and very
common phenomena in biology that may help to inform our search for the right
way to conduct argument. Thus, for our current purposes, the reader should not
worry too much about exactly what all the curves are that are graphed in figure
4. The important part of these diagrams for us is that over time (t) a perceptual
signal is brought into line with a reference R (or goal), which is fixed. This is
successfully achieved in 3(a) and 3(b), but not in 3(c). In complex real-world
systems like human beings, the reference is not usually fixed like this, of
course, but may fluctuate just like the perceptual signal, since any one
subsystem will probably be subject to many other subsystems attempting to
modify its goals. In a loose hierarchy these modifications may even come from
"lower down". However, as a general rule, a reference signal will need to
change more slowly than a perceptual signal if stable equilibrium is to be
achieved.
In 3(a), a simple control system is given an output gain of 10, which is relatively
low. The organism (or in this case, the computer simulation of an organism) is
taking a relaxed, laid-back approach to getting what it wants (it isn't a "gogetter"), and it reaches stable equilibrium smoothly, but gradually (things just
keep getting better and better, and only rarely get a little bit worse). However, it
takes a long time to get what it wants. This would be analogous to an argument
in which Bill did as little as possible to disturb Susan’s belief system, taking his
time to explain his position one step at a time, as slowly as possible (with
Susan presumably doing the same, or else Bill’s feedback would probably not
be stable enough for this kind of control to work).
In 3(b), we see an organism with a higher gain of 50. Here, stable equilibrium
is reached, but not without some thrashing about and instability first (things get
worse before they get better, but they do get better). Here, Bill is not pushing
Susan too hard, but he is disturbing her beliefs in an aggressive manner. He
isn't "laid-back", but he’s not trying to railroad her into agreeing with him either.
Control is achieved more quickly, although the process is messier.
In 3(c), however, the output gain is 100. The system is in run-away oscillation,

thrashing wildly, getting further and further away from stability (things just keep
getting worse and worse). If the gain were intermediate between 50 and 100,
we might see more stable thrashing, where the system keeps oscillating
without control being achieved, but where things at least don’t get
progressively worse. For instance, Bill and Susan may find themselves
repeating the same mistakes over and over, going in circles, because neither
is really listening to the other, and they are both just trying too hard.
While one possible explanation for thrashing is trying too hard, another
possible reason is low bandwidth, meaning that the partners are not
communicating enough information to each other to achieve stable control.
Insufficient bandwidth causes very similar problems as trying too hard, and the
two problems often go hand in hand. In fact, a result of trying too hard is usually
that less information is transmitted. If Bill is pushing Susan too hard to
understand his position right away, he is probably not taking his time to explain
everything in detail. When we push too hard, we expect results right away,
where what may be needed is a slow and steady approach with a lot of
information being transmitted, and a more relaxed attitude towards getting
results.
Sometimes, of course, low bandwidth can cause thrashing even though the
partners are not trying too hard. The bandwidth can be low, for instance, simply
due to physical constraints. Perhaps the partners are writing letters back and
forth, and they simply need the higher bandwidth of a face-to-face meeting to
achieve equilibrium. (You might want to argue that writing letters back and forth
actually provides quite high bandwidth, since one is free to write very long
letters packed full of information. However, what is important in control theory is
how much information can be transmitted before feedback would normally be
received back from the environment. Humans normally get feedback quite
quickly in a face-to-face conversation; in letter writing, the feedback takes
much longer, so there is relatively little bandwidth.)
If Bill, for example, uses a high-gain/low-bandwidth strategy, he will
immediately change his method whenever he sees Susan not responding the
way he wants (he is trying too hard). The right approach is often to give
whatever method one is using time to work, and only change strategies if it
fails over a prolonged period. Of course, this is not to say that low-gain/high
bandwidth is always the way to go. Sometimes it really is best to try as hard as
you can. But next time you find yourself "running around in circles", and not
getting anywhere, remember figure 4, and try to think if perhaps a more relaxed
approach to getting what you want might work better in the long run.

20. Coalescent Argumentation Therapy
I will divide coalescent argumentation therapy into three stages. The
presumption here is that two arguers have come to us seeking therapy,

because their argument was going nowhere. Thus, they are predisposed to
going through some trouble to fix things (like drawing out complex goal
diagrams). However, the basic ideas could still work on a more informal level
in everyday argumentation. The first step will be to draw the goal diagrams,
after which the participants will uncover common goals and seek to merge their
beliefs in a way acceptable to both parties.
Coalescent argumentation is more cooperative than other approaches where
each partner is out to "win". Both partners must, for it to work most
successfully, have coalescent argumentation as one of their goals. This means
they must truly want to come to a mutually satisfactory conclusion. The back
and forth of their argumentation will, if all goes well, result in the coalescing of
their opposing views into a maximally satisfactory result. Figure 4 (a) and (b)
showed diagrams of the kind of equilibrium that is sought in a living organism.
The coalescing of two points of view that occurs in coalescent argumentation is
a particular case of such biological equilibrium.

21. Coalescent Argumentation Therapy, Stage I: Drawing the Goal Diagram
Gilbert proposes a suite of tactics for achieving coalescence. One of the first
things we must do, he says, is attempt to uncover as many hidden goals as
possible. The set of Bill’s goals of which he is aware will be called G(Bill) and
the set of Susan’s goals of which she is aware, G(Susan). Coalescent
argumentation involves bringing into awareness (into G) as many of one’s
goals as possible. This "increases their likelihood of satisfaction" and "opens
the possibilities of the identification of mutually held goals."
If Bill and Susan are both practicing coalescent argumentation, they will start by
trying to understand their goals. Let us assume they have both been having this
company X argument for a week now, and are getting nowhere—they are
thrashing. They come to us for counseling in coalescent argumentation, of
which they have heard great things. We start with Stage I, by giving them each
the assignment of separately trying to draw figure 3. Since they perceive the
world differently, they might come up with radically different diagrams. Already
we have a meta-level argument about exactly what is going on in the primary
argument in the first place. But note that it is unlikely that they will coalesce on a
mutually agreeable conclusion if they proceed to argue each with an entirely
different idea of what is going on in the argument. So once they have each
attempted to draw figure 3, they must negotiate between them a working
version that they can agree on.
Notice that "winning and losing" has entirely been put to the side, for now. We
are not asking Bill and Susan to stop caring about winning and losing, just to
put their concern with it a bit on the back-burner for the time being, and
concentrate on understanding what each other’s goals and beliefs are.
The focus of this step in the counselling is what Gilbert calls "dark-side" goals

and beliefs (Gilbert 1997: 105-106). These are of two main types: (i)
unrevealed: goals or beliefs known to the arguer, but unrevealed for any of a
variety of reasons, and (ii) unknown: goals or beliefs unknown to the arguer (or
at least the arguer is not aware of their role in the argument). The more intense
the disagreement, according to Gilbert, "the more crucial it is to uncover and
explore the dark-side positional constituents."
The entire goal-belief network relevant to a particular argument claim is, recall,
the position, for which the claim is merely an external manifestation. What we
have been calling "belief", however, covers far more than the usual everyday
use of the term, since we are including any persistent pattern of transforming
perceptual signals into action. In Gilbert’s terminology (Gilbert 1997: 75-88,
110), the traditional sense of "belief" is what we call such persistent patterns
when they are in the "logical mode". When they are in the "emotional mode",
we call them emotions. When in what Gilbert calls the "kisceral mode", we call
them intuitions, and when in what he calls the "visceral mode", they correspond
to aspects of the physical environment, which are of course also part of the
control loop (although these are downplayed in figure 3, they should not be in
general if they are relevant). Since the visceral components are external to the
organism, however, I would tend not to say they are part of the "position".
However, they are certainly part of the "positional analysis", but of course in a
proper PCT analysis of an argument, positional, environmental and goal
analysis cannot really be separated from each other. All are crucial
components in the control feedback loop, the nature of which may completely
change if only one is concentrated on and not the others. Hence, Gilbert’s
stages I and II (goal analysis and positional analysis respectively) are here
merged into a single stage, since goals and beliefs/emotions/intuitions cannot
be separated from each other in perceptual control theory.
If our counselling is to be practical, of course, we must avoid being too
idealistic. We must not require absolutely that Bill and Susan uncover and put
on the table all of their dark-side goals and beliefs. If Susan really wants to
keep her crush on Bill a secret, she should not be required to reveal it.
However, it is nonetheless important for her to try and draw as complete a
version of figure 3 as she can, knowing that she need only show Bill that portion
of it that she decides to make public. Once she shows her public diagram to
Bill, keeping her private version hidden, they can compare notes, and proceed
to modify each other’s diagrams, attempting to come up with a mutually
agreeable diagram. This may only be partially achievable, of course, and the
participants may have to accept at some point that they have somewhat
different views on what is happening and move on. But the more agreement
can be achieved at this pre-argument stage, the more likely will the participants
be able to succeed in the actual argumentation stage. By the time a diagram is
actually agreed on, Bill and Susan might feasibly have come to understand
each other’s positions to such an extent that agreement on the actual argument
will almost fall right out of their pre-argument agreement.

22. Coalescent Argumentation Therapy, Stage II: Finding Mutual Goals and
Beliefs
Assuming Bill and Susan have now, relatively speaking, agreed on a
belief/goal diagram, they can proceed to look for mutual goals to help them
achieve maximum goal satisfaction. We will start them out by asking them to
find goals on Bill’s and Susan’s side of the diagram that are mutual. The larger
is the intersection of G(Bill) and G(Susan), the greater the chance of
coalescence. "By becoming aware of the role goals play in argumentation,
arguers can better focus on securing their own needs as well as attempting to
satisfy those of their opposers. When the satisfaction of needs is maximized,
the opportunity for a mutually agreeable conclusion is maximized as well."
(Gilbert 1997: 74)
It should be noted that mutual goals fall into two general classes:
(1) mutually achievable goals, or goals that Susan and Bill can cooperatively
achieve without conflict. These may or may not actually be that similar, so long
as they can both be met simultaneously.
(2) similar or like-minded goals, which often go along with similar beliefs. This
occurs, for instance, when Bill and Susan both belief something and have a
related goal. For instance, they both have the goal of getting more money and
believe getting a raise is the way to do it. Yet, these goals may not be mutually
achievable, especially if there is competition for raises in the company, and Bill
and Susan both know only one raise will be given in their division.
Both kinds of mutual goals can be important to uncover. The former is
obviously important, since maximizing mutual goal satisfaction is a common
goal of participants in coalescent argumentation. The latter is also important,
though, since it provides the participants with a common base upon which to
build an understanding of the parts of each other’s hierarchies that are not so
readily understood.

23. Coalescent Argumentation Therapy, Stage III: Empathy and Merging
Once Bill and Susan have agreed, to the extent possible, on the goal/belief
network, and have isolated mutual beliefs and goals, they can move on to
stage III, the attempt to actual merge their positions, to "coalesce". The
groundwork is already laid in their mutual points of agreement, and on their
pragmatic points of possible mutual satisfaction. But now comes the really
hard part—finding points of coalescence between the areas of their networks
that are not already compatible.
Stage III requires empathy. The goal here is to understand the other’s
goal/belief network well enough to almost feel it is one’s own. Bill and Susan
cannot possibly merge their conflicting views on widget making unless they can

truly come to understand each other’s positions. This may well require a more
detailed and careful analysis than I have provided in figure 3. They may have to
analyze Bill’s reasons for believing X’s widgets are good, which will involve his
beliefs about what a widget is good for, as well as his goals and motivations
for being interested in widgets in the first place (some of which are face goals
or broad financial motives). For Susan, who knows more about widgets than
Bill, this may require recalling how it was when she was only a beginner at
widget design. Or it may involve simulating in her own networks the processes
going on in Bill’s head, even if she has really never seen the world like that at
all. Bill, on the other hand, will have to actually learn something about the more
technical aspects of widget making.
Empathy is difficult, yet absolutely crucial to coalescent argumentation. If the
conflicting position is not understood, it will not be possible to merge it with
one’s own. Gilbert describes this empathic stage as an act of sheer will. One
must "project oneself into another’s position". "The quality of listening and
observation required for the empathic comprehension of another’s position is
no mean feat; it demands, at least temporarily, the suspension of the drive to
persuade or convince, i.e., to win, in favor of the desire to agree." (Gilbert
1997: 111)
Of course, complete empathy will not always be possible, but then complete
merging of the two positions will not usually be achieved either. We can only
ask that Bill and Susan try their best, and they may be quite happy to settle for
partial coalescence, such as a partial merging, or a failed attempt at merging
that nonetheless results in better understanding between them. Gilbert points
out as well (Gilbert 1997: 113) that even if no real merging materializes at all,
the coalescent procedure might still eliminate many points of disagreement as
not really central to the argument, providing the participants with a more
focussed view of their disagreement.

24. Conclusion
In summary, there are three main stages to coalescent argumentation therapy:
(1) Model each other’s goal-belief networks:
(a) design private versions.
(b) reveal public versions.
(c) negotiate a working version.
(2) Find compatible goals and beliefs:
(a) find mutually held beliefs and goals.
(b) find mutually satisfiable goals.

(3) Empathize and coalesce:
(a) project into remaining incompatible parts of your partner’s network.
(b) find ways of merging these beliefs and/or goals with your own.
Of course, one can practice coalescent argumentation without explicitly
drawing PCT diagrams, or any other technical diagrams for that matter. Still,
using such diagrams may provide the structure needed to learn basic
coalescent skills, before learning to practice the skills without the diagrams
(since actually drawing large, complex diagrams is rarely practical, especially
in typical day-to-day arguing). Also, the general principles of coalescent
argumentation are independent of the particulars of perceptual control theory,
so it could perhaps still be practiced even by those with a very anti-PCT view of
beliefs and goals. Even so, I think PCT provides a very compatible framework
in which to talk about coalescent argumentation.
In uncovering so much of the goal hierarchy, the arguing partners can
concentrate, not on "defeating" their partner's attempts to achieve their goals,
but instead on allowing the other participant to achieve their dominant goals in
some other fashion than that assumed in the subordinate argument. Argument
proceeds from some initial disagreement, to filling in of the other’s goals, to
mutual satisfaction of those goals "coalescing" into a happy resolution.
Of course, you cannot expect to resolve all arguments with this method. The
point is not that disagreement is unreal and simply a byproduct of the
misunderstanding of goals—if only we understand each other we will all agree.
Rather, the point is that coalescent goal-centred argumentation will enable the
participants in even the most intractable arguments to strip away many of the
unnecessary obstacles to agreement and, even if agreement is never actually
reached, develop a better understanding of each other’s positions, and thus
inevitably a better understanding of their own.
This work could perhaps be best extended by further developing the Bill-Susan
example so that it is clear exactly how coalescence could be achieved by
them. Beyond that, it would be quite useful to see how two actual arguers
embroiled in a real argument react to being taught such a system of diagram
drawing and modification as a way of improving their argumentation skill.
Perhaps some would just scoff. Perhaps others would not be up to the
challenge of having to empathize with someone they feel is irrational. The hope
would be that most, however, would at least learn somewhat better
communication skills, listening more often to their opponents, empathizing,
slowing down and not trying so hard, and hopefully learning to argue by
understanding instead of by confrontation.
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